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RETREAT INTO MYTH: JosEPH GoEBBELS, KoLBERG, AND THE IDEAL 
IN NAZI CINEMA 
BY RoBERT LEVINE '00 
"All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: 
war."- Walter Benjamin 
"Even entertainment is nowadays politically important, if not 
decisive for the outcome of the war."- Joseph Goebbels 
"Cinema is a ribbon of dreams."- Orson Welles 
Nazi cinema enjoys a dual position in the 
history of German film. It stands as the dark 
hallmark of an abhorrent and reprehensible 
regime while at the same time representing a 
time of great success and productivity for the 
nation's industry, spawning films that still fas-
cinate and engage cineastes today, both for 
their inherent quality and craft as well as their 
role as propaganda pieces designed to further 
indoctrinate their audiences with National 
Socialist ideology. Both Adolf Hitler and Min-
ister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels were 
avid film enthusiasts prior to and throughout 
their ascension to power; they were also great 
opportunists, and in assuming control over the 
German film industry, they took the reins of 
what was arguably the most productive and 
influential in Europe. 
In many ways, the Nazi leadership and 
the German cinema made for an easy court-
ship. The German national cinema, ironically 
enough, grew out of an overtly nationalist 
thrust-an urgent desire to see German habits 
and German traditions compete with other 
foreign cultures for representation on screen 
(Taylor 126). Upon takeover, the Nazis "inher-
ited a cinema with a strong and distinctive 
national tradition at a time when film was al-
ready accepted as a respectable and effective 
medium for the transmission of ideas" (Tay-
lor 142). Hitler and Goebbels would shed this 
distinctive tradition (characterized by the stark 
amorality and expressionistic aesthetic of films 
like Fritz Lang's M) almost immediately upon 
takeover, however, opting to take the nation-
alism to a much higher level-into the realm of 
fantasy. Hitler's tenants of Aryan superiority, 
racial purity and the "inevitable" rise of the 
Nazi empire congealed into a grandiose false 
ideal, a work of megalomaniacal imagination, 
and the cinema would prove the ideal medium 
for pushing it through: "As a regime commit-
ted to an irrational ideology, the Third Reich 
was drawn naturally to a medium whose ap-
peal lay in its ability to alter reality to create 
the proper emotional effect" (Weinberg 105). 
Hitler and Goebbels recognized, more perhaps 
than anyone else in history did, the power of 
the cinema as a formative political tool, and 
they set it into action right away. 
Debate persists among scholarly studies 
of Nazi cinema regarding how many of the 
films produced during the period of Nazi rule 
(1933-1945) actually constitute "propaganda," 
due partially to the definitional difficulties the 
term itself presents. In his book Film Propa-
ganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, Rich-
ard Taylor makes an admirable attempt to sort 
through the various trappings of the word, 
coming to a succinct conclusion: "Propaganda 
is the attempt to influence the public opinions 
of an audience through the transmission of 
ideas and values" (15). For the purposes of this 
essay, this definition will suffice. The other 
variable that grays the propaganda label at-
tached to the Nazi cinema is that many of the 
films produced under the regime were con-
sciously created as entertainment, rather than 
instructional or intimidation pieces. What one 
might conceive as a period brimming with 
sledgehammer-subtle cinematic assaults of 
Orwellian brainwashing upon even a cursory 
examination reveals an industry output pri-
marily composed of slick entertainment fare 
on par with what is normally associated with 
Hollywood. According to author Eric 
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Rentschler, "so-called 'unpolitical' features 
constituted 86% of the epoch's films" (Illusion 
37). Citing film sociologist Gerd Albrecht's 
Nationalsozialistische Politik, Rentschler writes 
that II generic" or entertainment productions 
constituted 941 of the 1,094 feature films made 
under Nazi control, including 295 melodramas 
and biopics, 123 detective and adventure films, 
and 523 comedies and musicals (Rentschler Af-
terlife 7). This was a cinema dominated by "for-
mula fare and escapist diversion replete with 
well-known stars, upbeat scores and alluring 
production values" (Rentschler Afterlife 9). In 
other words, it was no two-minute hate, and 
this inclination to entertain was reflected in 
many of Nazi Germany's larger social policies. 
National Socialism was "a political order that 
openly proffered tourism, consumerism and 
recreation as dialectical complements to law, 
order and restriction" (Rentschler Afterlife xi). 
To those people not alienated, despised and 
deported by the fascist ideologies of the party, 
Nazi Germany aimed to please (albeit with 
candy-bar concessions and pleasures as manu-
factured and orchestrated as anything else). 
A government repute for its public rallies and 
splendiferous parades, "show business and 
National Socialism were of a piece" 
(Rentschler fllusion 35). 
Nazi Germany is history's most infamous 
cult of personality, and Hitler is the dictator 
star-supreme, but if any one person were as-
signed the role of Oz, the man behind the cur-
tain, it would be Goebbels, Reich Minister for 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. 
Goebbels was appointed in March of 1933. A 
brilliant orator and consummate mythmaker, 
his role in the party to that point had been part 
salesmen, part ringmaster. Goebbels was re-
sponsible for making his Fuhrer not simply 
palatable to the public, but irresistible, and he 
orchestrated large parades and musical re-
views to that end (Baird 16). Upon his appoint-
ment to Minister, he assumed control over all 
the media and communications apparatuses 
of German society in the form of the 
Reichskulturkammer, or State Chambers of Cul-
ture, with branches for each of the main me-
dia enterprises (Art, Music, Theatre, Author-
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ship, Press, Radio and Film) (Manvell and 
Fraenkel 69). With the film industry in par-
ticular, he pledged reform, and the provisional 
Reich Film Chamber [Reichsfilmkammer] was 
established by July 1933 (Manvell and 
Fraenkel69). All professionals in the industry 
were required to join (non-Aryans being ex-
cluded, having been promptly expelled) (Tay-
lor 145). A single official film industry trade 
union (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) was established, 
for which membership was also compulsory 
(Manvell and Fraenkel 70). The Reich Film 
Law of February 1934 ensured that all scripts 
were examined and revised prior to produc-
tion (Manvell and Fraenkel 71). A rigid sys-
tem of film censorship, in keeping with the 
party line, came into being, with Goebbels at 
the very top of the heap. It was designed so 
that his directives" could pass down the chain 
of command to those actually engaged 
in ... drama and film production" (Manvell and 
Fraenkel 69). Citing Albrecht, Weinberg 
writes, "Goebbels was involved intensively in 
the conceptualization and production of pro-
paganda films in general and of weekly news-
reels in particular" (107). Film was undoubt-
edly his passion. His personal diaries are "re-
plete with references to movie stars, appear-
ances at premieres, and criticisms of specific 
films and actors" (Weinberg 107). A perusal 
of his wartime diaries from 1939-41 shows that 
he reserved time almost every evening to 
watch films, revise scripts, etc. He even en-
joyed American pictures. Of Frank Capra's Mr. 
Deeds Goes to Town, he wrote: "Marvelous stuff 
from America, with Gary Cooper. Wonder-
fully made, excellent ideas, beautifully acted. 
I am delighted" (Diaries 13). Of course, with 
Hollywood's non-Aryan power base, his ap-
preciation could only go so far: "In the 
evening, Leni Riefenstahl reports to me on her 
trip to America. She gives me an exhaustive 
description, and one that is far from encour-
aging. We shall get nowhere there. The Jews 
rule by terror and bribery" (Diaries 9). 
From his success as a rally speaker and 
parade organizer, Goebbels understood the 
advantages of addressing a crowd, for "it is 
crowds rather than isolated individuals that 
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may be induced to run the risk of death to se- nificance of propaganda decreased. Goebbels, 
cure the triumph of a creed or an idea" (Baird however, felt that propaganda efforts should 
17). It is no wonder he gravitated towards the be continued even after power has been con-
cinema, for as Taylo! articulates: solidated (Taylor 143). Add~tionally, aesthet-
Cinema appeals to the individual as a ics were absolutely a concern and, above all, 
member of a crowd. In this context it Goebbels never wanted an audience member 
contains elements of theatre: the mem- to "know that today he's going to a political 
ber of a cinema audience, like a specta- film." Disallowing that realization was to 
tor in a theatre, is uniquely susceptible Goebbels the key to effective propaganda, and 
not only to his or her own emotions, but the primary impetus behind his emphasis on 
to those of the mass around, and to the entertainment. He feared that overtly politi-
interaction between the emotions of that cal propaganda, where the hand of the gov-
individual and those of the mass .. . he/ ernment was clearly visible, risked alienating 
she is like putty in the propagandist's the audience. An audience aware that it is the 
hands (16). target of didacticism will naturally be skepti-
Goebbels recognized the formative power of cal, and Goebbels hoped to avoid such a dy-
the cinema, its remarkable ability to influence namic. As Goebbels stated in a letter to Soviet 
and suggest. He set out to create a film indus- filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, presumably in an 
try in full service of the Reich, where every attempt to solicit his participation: "I do not 
exposed frame constituted a brick in an ever- require a film to begin and end with a National 
climbing ideological wall, whose purpose was Socialist procession. Leave these to us - we 
to contain the German masses and the world know how to do them better than you do" ( qtd. 
at-large in a psychic enclosure with the Nazi/ in Taylor 211). Goebbels relegated more overt 
Aryan ideal, further separating all three from forms of propaganda to the newsreels that pre-
the polluted nature of the regime and the sin- ceded each film showing. He disdained overly 
ister reality it imposed. intellectual or experimental projects, keeping 
It was Goebbels who kept Nazi cinema his eye firmly fixed on the lowest common de-
firmly steeped in its entertainment founda- nominator and the bottomline. In 1937, when 
tions. In this, he disagreed with Hitler on two American imports were sti~l out-finessing do-
fundamental points regarding propaganda. mestic German productions, he kept his ear 
First, Hitler felt that art and politics should be to the ground; audiences made it clear they 
kept distinct and separate. In his book Mein desired their Steamboat Willie before their 
Kampf, he writes, "where the destiny and ex- Battleship Potemkin. His features were to main-
istence of a people are at stake, all obligation tain "the appearance of escapist vehicles and 
toward beauty ceases" (19). In conversation, innocent recreations" (Rentschler Afterlife 16). 
he remarked: Images of boot-stomping and sieg-heils were 
Certainly, on the one hand I want to use also threatening to international audiences, for 
the film fully and completely as a me- Goebbels was a shrewd businessman-he ex-
dium of propaganda, but in such a way pected the German film industry to be the most 
that every viewer knows that today he's successful in the world. His immediate nation-
going to a political film .. .It makes me alization of the film industry upon takeover 
sick when people make politics under in 1933 ensured that all profits from the films 
the guise of art. Either art or politics... fed back into government hands. Rentschler 
(qtd. in Taylor 148). encapsulates Goebbels' objectives best: 
Second, Hitler felt that the importance of [H]e wanted films with formal assur-
strong propaganda is inversely proportional ance and popular appeal, fantasy pro-
to party membership. It is crucial only insofar ductions that would expand German 
as it is necessary to draw allegiance. Once al- market shares and alleviate the need for 
legiance is solidified, Hitler felt that the sig- foreign imports. He sought to create a 
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star system; he cultivated scriptwriters 
and directors. Like any Hollywood en-
trepreneur, he checked box-office re-
turns and stressed the crucial role of 
advertising . .. Goebbels articulated a de-
sire to create a cinema that could both 
satisfy the domestic market and func-
tion as a foreign emissary (Afterlife 19). 
Goebbels became, in a way, a perverse Cecil 
B. DeMille: part entertainer, part businessman, 
all emotional engineer. Writes Manvell: "The 
effect of [Goebbel' s] controls was to lower the 
temperature of German film-making until it 
approached zero ... German films became es-
capist and politically harmless, or nondescript; 
and notable for the absence, rather than the 
presence, of a swastika" (Manvell and 
Fraenkel72). Indeed, many of these films were 
designed as period pieces to assume an empty 
"universalism" and avoid comparison with 
contemporary political realities. However, 
Manvell' s statement is slightly misleading in 
that it equates surface elements and content 
("absence, rather than the presence, of a swas-
tika") with an inherent political innocuous-
ness. Posed with the aforementioned ques-
tion- can these ostensibly "harmless," apoliti-
cal films be considered propaganda? - the 
answer lies resolutely in the affirmative. They 
were made with the express purpose of ush-
ering through the antiseptic facade of the 
"true" Aryan existence as fabricated by the 
Nazi party, an existence that could only re-
ally subsist on screen- in the realm of the ideal 
and the fantastic. 
If Nazi film production kept a steady 
pace prior to 1940, the onset of war kicked it 
into high gear. The industry itself was never 
more successful- escapist fare made film 
houses a welcome refuge from the trials of 
wartime living. It was not until 1942, when 
the Sixth army of the German forces lost over 
three-quarters of its numbers to death or cap-
ture at the battle of Stalingrad, did a 
discernable shift in Goebbels' approach to con-
ceiving the propaganda feature take place. 
With the production of Munchhausen (1943) 
Goebbels made a direct attempt to prompt a 
psychological and spiritual rebound on the 
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part of the German populace in response to a 
specific political/military setback (Rentschler 
Afterlife 193). His strategy was characteristi-
cally diverting, and the product more 
fantastical than ever. Stalingrad and 
Munchhausen concurrently mark "the water-
shed in delineating Goebbel' s shift from a com-
bination of factual-mythical propaganda-
which characterized his approach during the 
early years of the war- to an increasing de-
pendence on irrational themes" (Baird 40). So 
would begin Goebbels' "total war of illusion 
meant to distract Germans from painful and 
traumatic realities, from the presentiment of a 
national catastrophe and the shame of mass 
murder" (Rentschler Afterlife 212). Days after 
a massive Allied bombing, Munchhausen pre-
miered in Berlin as part of Ufa' s 251h anniver-
sary celebration (Rentschler Afterlife 194). Con-
ceived as the "ultimate entertainment," the 
film is a ribald pop fantasy based on a popu-
lar piece of European folklore. The eponymous 
hero is a grand liar whose on-screen antics bear 
an interesting parallel to the Minister of Pro-
paganda himself: "This is to be the story about 
a hero who fabricates tales, and, mimicking the 
powers of cinema, incarnates a medium that 
traffics in illusions" (Rentschler Afterlife 198). 
No expense was spared in the creation of 
Munchhausen; Goebbels intended to produce 
a grandstanding showpiece that would dem-
onstrate the dominance of the German 
cinema's ability to entertain. The film's high-
concept production "put German technical 
genius on parade and offered a compelling-
and what was hoped to be reassuring-triumph 
of special effects" (Rentschler Afterlife 196). The 
film would also serve to anesthetize the Ger-
man populace to a stinging defeat on the battle-
field and the ominous threat of Allied victory 
that was now raining down over their heads, 
providing the ultimate vehicle of escape in the 
character of the Baron, whose magical powers 
allow him to travel through space and time 
and escape trepidation with ease. According 
to Rentschler, Munchhausen represents the 
era's "ultimate exercise in wishful thinking" 
(Afterlife 202). That is, until Kolberg. 
The loss at Stalingrad also propelled 
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Goebbels to green-light Kolberg, a historical During the shooting I constantly dis-
epic about a courageous civilian army defend- cussed with the officers the sacrifice that 
ing its town against Napolean' s forces, though the film involved for the military. Most 
the film would not see release until 1945. of them were gla~i, and none was keen 
Kolberg, as Tayior put it, became "the swan to get back to the front as soon as pes-
song of Nazi cinema" for which Munchhausen sible. But nobody understood why a 
is an interesting antecedent (196). Both stern film should be so important" (qtd. in 
from the same hyper-ambitious, reactionary Taylor 197). 
thrust on Goebbels' part: "With German re- It is ironic that a film portraying a defeatist 
versal in the Russian campaign in 1942 and and ineffectual military would provide refuge 
growing disillusionment on the hornefront, the for real German soldiers whose will to fight 
Minister of Propaganda turned his attention was quickly waning. Harlan continues: 
to what he believed would be the greatest It was the year 1944. Stalingrad had long 
movie ever produced" (Weinberg 113). Per- fallen and the danger of a war that had 
haps at the behest of an unfair precedent set been completely lost moved ever more 
by the popular success of Munchausen, uncomfortably close to us ... Hitler as 
Goebbels spearheaded a project that would well as Goebbels must have been con-
come to represent Nazi cinema's last gasp, a vinced that the distribution of a film like 
desperate conflagration of resources in last- this would be more useful than a rnili-
ditch service of an increasingly delusional ide- tary victory. They must have been hop-
ology. ing for a miracle. And what better to per-
Kolberg, like Munchhausen, was an enor- form a miracle than this' dream factory' 
mous undertaking. Like the filmmakers be- that is the cinema (qtd. in Taylor 197). 
hind Munchhausen, director Viet Harlan Uud What Goebbels hoped to achieve was a mass 
Suss) received carte blanche from Goebbels to grassroots galvanization, an awakening of 
complete the film according to his specifica- nationalist spirit in the German populace simi-
tions. Kolberg's budget would eventually ex- lar to the my-country-before-myself credo 
ceed that of Munchhausen, totaling upwards taken up by the Kolberg citizenry in the film. 
of 8.5 millions Reichmarks, almost eight times Again, as with Munchhausen, he felt a well-
the cost of an average film produced within timed cinematic spectacle of the highest qual-
the industry at the time (Taylor 196). Staging ity could prompt a psychological resuscitation 
its elaborate parade and battle scenes would in his audience, and he pursued it as a politi-
require the involvement of over 187, 000 cal necessity. Kolberg stands at the nexus of 
people, including several real army units Goebbels' two primary directives: on one end, 
(Weinberg 113). Nearly two years of shooting the aim to influence, dictate; on the other, the 
amassed over 90 hours of raw footage aim to entertain and enthrall. Investing as 
(Weinberg 113). Kolberg became a sinkhole of much as he did in the completion of Kolberg, it 
time and resources and a puzzling priority for is difficult to tell which one of these aims he 
the Minister of Propaganda. He removed more considered the priority; or, if he saw any dif-
and more troops from the field to act as extras ference between these two motives at all. 
in the film. Even with a scarcity of real amrnu- More than most Goebbels-sanctioned 
nition on the WWII battlefields, Goebbels had features, Kolberg wears its propagandic intent 
munitions factories work double time to pro- on its sleeve. It is, like many films in the Nazi 
duce blanks for the film (Weinberg 113). De- oeuvre, a period piece, though clearly in-
spite the need for preservatives and food sup- tended as an allegory, with themes of duty and 
plies all across the empire, tons of salt were sacrifice intended as relevant to the contern-
shipped in to give the illusion of snow (Tay- porary German dilemma. A title opens the 
lor 197). Even Harlan, the director, expressed film, reading "Breslau, 1813." Citizens of the 
confusion as to his Minister's intentions: city march en masse down its streets, filling 
ArticuLa.te · 2000 
Robert Levine 
the screen. They walk arrn-in-arrn, singing in 
unison. Inside his chambers, the King of 
Prussia, Frederick William II, is braced by com-
mander Gneisenau, Goebbels' cinematic 
stand-in and mouthpiece. In the background, 
a choir can be heard singing lines from a poem 
by German patriot Theodor Komer, a poem 
Goebbels quoted famously in his speech an-
nouncing total war in 1943 (Taylor 198). 
Gneisenau demands a proclamation from the 
king inviting the citizens to participate in the 
war effort. The King scoffs at first, calling 
Gneisenau an "impractical dreamer." "Real-
ity is different," says the King. "I know real-
ity," says Gneisenau, again establishing his 
character affinity with Goebbels, the 
rnythmaker and the propagator of "truth." "I 
looked [reality] in the face many years ago" 
says Gneisenau, "at Kolberg." We then dis-
solve to a title reading "Vienna, 1806." This 
will be the film's central narrative, framed by 
the story of Gneisenau and the King. After 
hearing an announcement declaring the sur-
render of the various cities of the German 
Empire to Napoleon, we switch to Kolberg, 
where the people are celebrating in an annual 
festival. Nettlebeck, the brewrnaster and 
mayor of the village, is concerned over the 
threat of French occupation. A paragon of na-
tionalism and stubborn pride, Nettlebeck is 
set off against the other "pragmatists" of the 
town leadership, who intend to surrender to 
Napoleon should his forces reach Kolberg. The 
military presence in the town is inept and lazy; 
they've allowed their cannons to rust. To-
gether with a wounded lieutenant seeking ref-
uge from battle, Nettle beck sets out to prepare 
the citizenry of Kolberg for retaliation. Mean-
while, the lieutenant, named Shill, strikes up 
a romance with a local farm girl named Maria. 
Nettlebeck's rebuking of a French emissary 
draws Napolean's wrath. The emperor steers 
his armies toward Kolberg. As Loncadou, 
Kolberg's misled military commander, debates 
with Nettle beck over the necessity of fighting, 
French troops occupy the farmhouse of 
Maria's family, just outside of Kolberg. Maria's 
brother Klaus, portrayed as an effeminate 
rnilquetoast, toasts Napoleon with the French 
35 
soldiers, disgracing his father. Nettlebeck is 
imprisoned for his insolence. He sends Maria 
on a mission to Konigsberg to demand of the 
King that a ne'Y commander be sent to 
Kolberg. At the behest of the citizenry, 
Nettlebeck is freed, and the new commander 
arrives; it is Gneisenau, now participating in 
his own narrative and again providing voice 
to Goebbels' dictums. Gneisenau scolds 
Nettle beck for his questioning of orders. "You 
want to lead but can't obey?" he asks. Here 
we see the fascist ideology begin to emerge; 
in times of great distress and turmoil, concern 
for one's homeland is pivotal, but never at the 
expense of hierarchy and order. "Otherwise," 
the commander states "we'd be on the road to 
anarchy." In the following scene, with a speech 
supposedly scripted by Goebbels himself, 
Gneisenau addresses the people of Kolberg 
directly (Manvell and Fraenkel85). He begins 
with "Citizens of Kolberg, Prussians, Ger-
mans!" effectively drawing the intended meta-
phoric line of the film. He states: 
No love is more sacred than love for 
one's fatherland. No joy is sweeter than 
the joy of freedom . .. Citizens and sol-
diers, from farm labourer to citizen gen-
eral, you want to be as good as your fa-
thers were. Dare to live up to them: you 
have their example, so set an example. 
The best way to defend a fortress is to 
attack (qtd. in Taylor 204). 
As Taylor points out, "once more we have a 
speech in the film that could just as well be 
addressed to the Berliners of 1945 as to the 
Kolbergers of 1807" (Taylor 204). The battle 
ensues, and the Kolberg uprising proves to be 
a resilient one. The people make continual sac-
rifices of person and property, but ultimately 
prevail. They succeed in keeping the French 
forces from breaching their gates. The story 
then returns to 1813 in Breslau. Gneisenau has 
completed his story, and his King is swayed. 
As he sits down to sign the proclamation, 
Gneisenau moves to the window looking out 
over the Prussian people. Inspired by the 
memories of Kolberg, he begins to pontificate, 
and his words summarize the ultimate desires 
of Goebbels. Speaking almost directly into the 
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camera at Goebbels' Berliner audience, the courageous Kolberg Aryans. The"life-and-
Gneisenau says: death" struggle of the Kolbergers is contrasted 
The people are filled with a mysterious with the "relative coldness" of the French (Tay-
strength. The example the citizens of lor 205). The Fren~h appear "distant in their 
Kolb.erg once gave them, they want to manner, they sit around at tables in rather ef-
follow and finally shake off their chains. fete fashion, and they wear wigs" (Taylor 205). 
The people are rising for coming battle. In another shot, two French commanders c;on-
The storm is breaking loose ... from the verse in the foreground while a black man is 
ashes and rubble, like a phoenix, a new visible between them in the background," em-
people will rise. A new nation. phasizing to German audiences that the en-
The message is clear: Kolberg is an example. emy is racially inferior, and indeed racially 
Emulate it and find the honor they found. mixed as well" (Taylor 204). The French are 
Kolberg was a deliberate attempt at also used as negative examples of the authori-
political self-preservation via aesthetic means. tarian order prescribed by Gneisenau. The 
As a propaganda piece, it is a virtual catalogue French commander leading the assault on 
of prototypical Nazi/ Aryan qualities. Several Kolberg is told to order a cease-fire to accom-
other characteristics of the National Socialist modate peace talks in Tilsit. He rejects the 
ideal are evinced in addition to the chest- edict, declaring haughtily, "That does not ap-
thumping nationalism embodied by ply to me." Later, he is reprimanded for" cost-
Nettlebeck and Gneisenau. Not entirely rei- ing his Emperor an army!" Again, the fascist 
evant to the central lesson of the narrative, they ideal ("orders are orders") is reinforced by 
often serve to reinforce the ideal via counter- counterexample. Aryan gender typing is also 
point. For example, Maria's brother Klaus, evident in the multiple shots of women 
whose behavior confirms the Nazi distaste screaming frantically while their homes are 
toward internationalism. Klaus announces bombarded, their domestic realm violated 
early in the film that he has "become a citizen (Nettlebeck, on the other hand, watches his 
of the world" while abroad at music school. house burn and states simply, "Life goes on"). 
Nettle beck, the protector of the homeland, re- Kolberg ultimately proved to be too much, 
grets his decision to send him there. Fey and too late. By the time of its release, the fall of 
childish, Klaus is shown to contribute noth- the German Empire seemed inevitable. Due 
ing to the military cause. He drinks with to Allied infiltration, the film could not even 
French soldiers and cries at the sounds of can- be premiered in Berlin. Goebbels was forced 
non fire. Towards the end of the film, he fool- to parachute the film into the Atlantic Fortress 
ishly tries to retrieve his violin from his of Rochelle in occupied France (Taylor 206). 
flooded house and is struck down by a can- The encroaching specter of defeat seriously un-
non blast. An example of how self-interest dermined the film's propagandic message. 
breeds weakness, Klaus also demonstrates that Audience reception was lukewarm (Taylor 
"being abroad in Nazi cinema means poten- 206). Goebbels, however, remained irrepress-
tial attraction to the foreign, distance from the ible. When Kolberg fell to the Russians in 
homeland and all sources of well-being and March of 1945, Goebbels wrote in his diary: 
stability" (Rentschler Illusion 35). Internation- We have now had to evacuate Kolberg. 
alism is a corrupting influence. Indeed, after The town, which has been defended 
watching his son toast Napoleon, Klaus' fa- with such extraordinary heroism, could 
ther states that his house is tainted. "I'll never no longer be held. I will ensure that the 
sit at that table again. This house died when evacuation of Kolberg is not mentioned 
they stole my son." Later, he burns the house in the OKW report. In view of the se-
down and kills himself in the fire. The many vere psychological repercussions on the 
undesirable attributes of the French as por- Kolberg film we could do without that 
trayed in the film help to buttress the effigy of for the moment (Entries 167). 
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This comment speaks volumes, not only rais-
ing the question of which is the means and 
which is the ends (the war or the film), but 
indi~ating that Goebbels had now completely 
severed his tenuous fidelity to reality. As Tay-
lor articulates, propaganda "canalizes an al-
ready existing stream," but if that stream, that 
reality, is entirely false, the illusion breaks 
down (210). For this reason, Kolberg has come 
to embody "the declining fortunes of the 
Wehrmacht and the progressive retreat into 
myth which characterized Nazi propaganda 
during the last years of the Third Reich" (Baird 
9). Goebbels seems foolish to have pursued the 
project at the time that he did. Based on his 
comments earlier, Harlan himself was aware 
of the futility of the project, which might ex-
plain all the multiple references, both visual 
and aural, to self-burial throughout Kolberg. 
Nettlebeck is heard saying, "They can bum the 
houses, but not the ground. If they do, we'll 
become moles." Later, at Gneisenau's (i.e. 
Goebbels') order, the villagers dig out flood 
canals so that they can block the enemy's ad-
vance with water. The image of the villagers 
digging relentlessly in unison not only sug-
gests they're digging their own mass grave, 
but also evokes the mass graves used to bury 
the victims of the Holocaust. 
Indeed, Goebbels' edicts as Minister to-
wards the end of the war make the suggestion 
that his thoughts were not entirely lucid. On 
April 17, 1945, with Berlin about to be over-
run, Goebbels called a fifty-man assembly. He 
mentioned Kolberg, then announced plans for 
another film, "The Twilight of the Gods of 
Berlin," a film that would be shown a hun-
dred years in the future (Roper xxxi). His staff 
"looked at him with amazement and con-




Kolberg, despite its heritage, has all the 
makings of an extremely entertaining film, 
with endearing characters and battle se-
quences that are still impressive by today' s 
standards. To a viewer raised on the films of 
Hollywood, Kolberg's pleasures are easily ac-
cessible, primarily because its conventions are 
recognizable as our own, from the David vs. 
Goliath theme to the romantic side-plot (the 
only thing missing is comic relief). Indeed, 
Goebbels often "let Hollywood be his guide" 
and made" films crafted along classical Ameri-
can lines" (Rentschler Illusion 41). Addition-
ally, "the utopian energies tapped by the fea-
ture films of the Third Reich in a crucial man-
ner resembled, indeed at times consciously 
emulated, American dreams" (Rentschler Af-
terlife xii). Within this affinity, there lies a dis-
turbing realization: that our cinemas, and cul-
tures by association, are equal part myth-ma-
chines, rival purveyors of a deceptive ideal and 
that we, as viewers, are equally susceptible. It 
is simple, with the benefit of hindsight, to point 
out the propagandic elements that permeate 
the films of the Nazi Cinema, but would we 
have been so capable at the time of their re-
lease? Finally, we have the figure of Joseph 
Goebbels, a man consumed by his own myths 
and "enamored of [his] own media images" 
(Rentschler Afterlife 222). He came to personify 
Walter Benjamin's presage that, with the ad-
vent of the cinema, "[mankind's] self-alien-
ation has reached such a degree that it can 
experience its own destruction as an aesthetic 
pleasure of the first order" (Benjamin 242). 
With Kolberg, his roles as entertainer and en-
gineer became undistinguishable, perhaps 
even to him. 
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